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NOTES
REASSESSING FORCED MEDICATION OF
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN LIGHT OF
RIGGINS V NEVADA
In 1989, David Riggins was convicted of murder by a jury and
sentenced to death.' During his trial, Riggins was administered ex-
tremely large doses of antipsychotic medication against his will and
over the objections of his counsel.' According to several psychiatrists
testifying at the trial, the doses administered to Riggins were "within
the toxic range"5 and sufficient to "tranquilize an elephant."' These
psychiatrists agreed that such large doses of medication were likely to
have affected Riggins' thought processes during trial.`' Depending on
how his system reacted to the medication, it could have made him
drowsy, confused, inattentive, ambivalent or even agitated and anx-
ious. 6 It was also likely that the medication administered to Riggins
affected his appearance and mannerisms before the court.' High levels
of antipsychotic drugs are known to depress a person's psychomotor
functions, slowing their movements and speech.' The drugs may also
alter a person's range of facial expressions and cause tremors, muscle
spasms, twitching and other involuntary movements. 9 These and the
many other side effects of antipsychotic medication—dehydration, con-
gestion, constipation, blurred vision, drooling, fatigue, weight gain,
skin disorders and sexual dysfunction—may cause discomfort, distress
or embarrassment."'
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810,1813 (1992).
2 See id.
3 1d. at 1816.
4 Id. at 1819 (Kennedy,,., concurring).
at 1816.
6 Higgins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
7 Id, at 1819 (Kennedy, j., concurring).
8 Id. at 1816.
9 1d. at 1819 (Kennedy,,]., concurring).
10 See infra notes 175-85 and accompanying text. Moreover, several of the more severe side
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Despite the substantial possibility that Riggins suffered from many
of these side effects, the State of Nevada claimed that it was justified
in medicating Riggins against his will to maintain his competency to
stand trial." Neither the State nor the trial court, however, had deter-
mined that Riggins would be incompetent if he was not medicated.' 2
Instead, the court evaluated Riggins while he was under the influence
of substantial antipsychotic medication and concluded that he was
competent to stand trial.' 3 Riggins subsequently requested that the
court terminate the medication, contending that the State could not
forcibly medicate him because it had not demonstrated that the drugs
were necessary to maintain his competency.' 4 Riggins also demanded
that the medication be ceased because it interfered with his ability to
present an insanity defense by making him appear sane.' 5 The court,
however, denied Riggins' request and permitted the State to continue
medicating him throughout his trial. 16
During the eight months between Riggins' competency hearing
and his trial, the State increased the dosage of medication they were
giving to Riggins to almost twice the amount administered during the
hearing.' 7
 Although the risk of side effects from antipsychotic medica-
tion increases significantly—and unpredictably—as the dosage is in-
creased, 18 the court proceeded with Riggins' trial without evaluating
whether the new level of drugs altered the content of his testimony or
impaired his ability to assist in his defense.' 9 At trial, Riggins pre-
sented an insanity defense and testified on his own behalf. 2° He admit-
ted to killing the victim, but claimed that the victim was trying to kill
him and that voices in his head told him killing the victim would be
justifiable homicide. 2 ' After listening to this testimony from an "ar-
tificially sane" Riggins, the jury rejected his plea of insanity, found him
guilty of murder with the use of a deadly weapon and sentenced him
to death. 22
effects may result in irreversible neurological or cardiac dysfunction, which in turn could lead to
death. Id.
" See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
12 See id. at 1815.
"M. at 1812.
1 ' 1 Id.
16 1d.
16 See Biggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812- 13.
17 1d. at 1813.
18 See infra notes 166,180 and accompanying text
1"See Rigklins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
2"Id. at 1813.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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Compelling Riggins and other insanity defendants to take antip-
sychotic medication during trial raises three distinct concerns that will
be the focus of this Note. First, it interferes with defendants' liberty
interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medication—an interest
which the United States Supreme Court recently recognized as sub-
stantial and retained by all individuals, including convicted criminals.°
The other two concerns arise because the state owes criminal defen-
dants a full and fair trial before it can deprive them of their life and
liberty. Forcibly administering antipsychotic drugs to criminal defen-
dants threatens their ability to get a fair trial in two ways. The medica-
tion may affect their willingness or capacity to understand and partici-
pate in the proceedings against them." It may also undermine their
insanity defense by denying their right to present the most reliable evi-
dence of their true mental state—their unmeclicated self—to the jury. 25
In part I of this Note, I will examine the United States Supreme
Court's review of compelled medication in Riggins v. Nevada. 26 The
Riggirts Court reversed the defendant's conviction, concluding that the
State had not justified overriding Riggins' liberty interest in avoiding
antipsychotic drugs. 27 Concluding that this error might have preju-
diced the original proceedings, the Court granted Riggins a new trial
but gave little indication of what the Nevada court should consider on
remand. 28 justice Kennedy's concurring opinion notes the lack of guid-
ance the majority's decision provides lower courts faced with balancing
a defendant's interests in refusing antipsychotic medication against a
state's interests in compelling it, and it provides a closer look at the
effects of medication on the defendant's right to a fair tria1, 2" The
limitations of the Court's opinion are further illustrated by the Su-
preme Court of Nevada's decision on remand.'" The Nevada court
interpreted Riggins as permitting the State to forcibly medicate the
defendant during his trial, without review of the impact of the drugs
on the proceedings, provided the State establish that medication is
essential to either maintaining Riggins' competence or to protecting
his safety or the safety of others. 31
23 Washington v. Hamer, 494 U.S. 210,221-22 (1990).
24 See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
25 See infra notes 47-77 and accompanying text.
Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815-16.
28 1d. at 1812.
25 See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
30 See Riggins v. State, 860 13.2d 705 (Nev. 1993) [hereinafter Riggins v. State II].
31 See id. at 706.
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Part II of the Note reviews challenges to the forced medication of
criminal defendants in the state courts." These courts have, as a rule,
failed to acknowledge a defendant's liberty interest in refusing un-
wanted medication, and instead, turned directly to the impact of the
medication on the defendant's right to a full and fair trial." Most have
further focused their attention on the effect of antipsychotic drugs on
an insanity defendant's right to present a defense, rather than the
impact of the drugs on his or her ability to understand and participate
in the proceedings. 34
To make the concerns of forced medication concrete, part III
discusses the use of antipsychotic medication in treating psychiatric
disorders, and focuses on the difficulties psychiatrists lace in predicting
the effectiveness of a given treatment and the frequent and severe side
effects associated with these drugs." Part IV of the Note explores the
possible impact of these side effects on a criminal defendant's consti-
tutional right to a full and fair trial. 36
 Part V explores situations in which
the courts have upheld the compelled medication of mentally ill per-
sons in state mental and correctional institutions, despite the grave risk
that the patients or inmates will suffer from at least some of the side
effects of these drugs. 37
Part VI of the Note suggests a comprehensive approach for review-
ing challenges to the forced medication of criminal defendants." In
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Riggins, this review must
necessarily begin with an acknowledgment of the defendant's funda-
mental interest in avoiding antipsychotic drugs." Next, because the
states typically allege that they are justified in medicating the defen-
dant to restore his competence to stand trial, an interest which has not
yet been recognized as outweighing an individual's liberty interest in
refusing the medication, the courts must strictly scrutinize this inter-
32 See infra notes 90-154 and accompanying text.
33 See, e.g., People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787, 797 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding State's
right to medicate incompetent defendants); State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 307 (S.C. 1978) (same);
Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 443 (Mass. 1983) (upholding defendant's right to
he tried drug free); State v. Maryott, 492 P.2d 239, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (same).
See, e.g., Law, 244 S.E.2d at 307 (holding that testimony on effect of medication on
defendant substitutes adequately for defendant's true demeanor); Maryoit, 492 P.2d at 243
(holding that testimony on effect of medication did not substitute adequately for defendant's
true demeanor).
35 See infra notes 155-88 and accompanying text,
36 See infra notes 189-238 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 239-93 and accompanying text
38
 See infra notes 294-319 and accompanying text.
"See Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct 1810, 1816 (1992).
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est." Whether forcibly medicating defendants substantially furthers the
state's interest in trying them necessarily encompasses a review of the
impact of the medication on their right to a fair trial."
1. RIGGINS V. NEVADA: THE SUPREME COURT REVIEWS FORCED
MEDICATION OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
In 1992, in Riggins v. Nevada, the United States Supreme Court
addressed whether forcibly administering antipsychotic medication to
a defendant during trial violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights." Nevada alleged that the State's need to maintain the defendant
in a competent mental state during his trial justified forcibly medicat-
ing him." The Supreme Court, however, held that the trial court erred
in permitting the medication of Riggins because the State had not
demonstrated that he would be incompetent to stand trial in an un-
medicated state." Concluding there was a substantial probability that
this unwarranted administration of antipsychotic drugs prejudiced the
defendant's trial, the Court remanded the case for further proceed-
ings."
In November 1987, David Riggins was arrested and charged with
murder." Within a week of being incarcerated, Riggins complained of
hearing voices and was voluntarily administered Mellaril, an antipsy-
chotic drug.° During February and March of 1988, when Riggins was
examined and found competent to stand trial, he was medicated with
450 milligrams of Mellaril." Subsequently, his counsel filed a motion
to terminate the medication, arguing that it impermissibly infringed
upon Riggins' freedom because the State had not determined that the
medication was necessary, nor had it considered less intrusive meas-
ures.'" Riggins also contended that the medication would compromise
his right to present an insanity defense by altering his demeanor
during his tria1. 50 The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion
and listened to the testimony of the three court-appointed psychiatrists
4° See infra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
42 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814.
44 Id. at 1812-13.
44 1d at 1815-16.
45 a at 1816-17.
4(1
 Id. at 1812.
41 Mains, 112 S. Ct. at 1812.
48 hi.
49 Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535,537 (Nev. 1991) [hereinafter Riggins v. State I).
5° Riggins, 112 S. CL at 1812.
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who had examined Riggins for his competency hearing. 5 I One expert
testified that it was his belief that Riggins would be competent to stand
trial even without medication. 52 A second expert would not predict how
Riggins would react if removed from the medication but questioned
the need for such high dosages." The third stated his belief that
Riggins was not competent to stand trial with or without the medica-
tion." Following the hearing, the court denied Riggins' motion to
discontinue the medication without giving any rationale for doing so. 55
Subsequently, the State continued to increase his medication until, by
the time of his trial, Riggins was being administered 800 milligrams
per day.56 At trial, Riggins entered a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity, testified on his own behalf and was convicted and sentenced
to death."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed Riggins' con-
viction and death sentence. 58 Although Riggins had briefed the issue,
the Nevada court failed to even mention Riggins' liberty interest in
avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. 59 Moreover,
although the court recognized that Riggins' demeanor was probative
evidence of his insanity, it concluded that expert testimony had suf-
ficiently informed the jury of the effect of the medication on Riggins'
attitude and demeanor. 6°
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court, reviewing the Ne-
vada court's decision, focused on Riggins' right to refuse medication.
According to the Court, once Riggins requested termination of his
medication, the State became obligated to establish that continued
administration was necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest,
and that the dosage administered was medically appropriate. 51 The
51
 Id. at 1813.
52 Id.
55 Id.
54 Id.
55
 See Riggins, 112 S. CL at 1813.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58
 Riggins v. State I, 808 P.2d 537, 538 (Nev 1991).
5`9
	 112 S. Ct. at 1813, 1816.
60 Riggins v. Stale I, 808 P.2d at 538.
61 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815. The United States Supreme Court has long held that a state
may infringe upon the fundamental rights of an individual to accomplish a compelling state
interest. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 370 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
To afford a certain level of judicial protection to individual rights, however, the intrusion not
only must substantially advance the state's interest, but also must be the least intrusive or
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Supreme Court had recently recognized, in Washington v. Harper, that
all individuals, including convicted criminals, have a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic med-
ication.62 The Harper Court found that this interest is encompassed in
the core of individual liberties that are protected from arbitrary gov-
ernmental action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.63 Forcibly injecting antipsychotic medication is highly intrusive
of this interest, the Court noted, not only because it physically invades
a person's body, but also because the medication alters the chemical
balance of their brain and presents a risk of serious and possibly even
fatal side effects. 64
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's silence re-
garding Riggins' liberty interest in avoiding medication and the State's
need to override this interest should not be interpreted as an adoption
of the State's view that medication was necessary to insure his compe-
tence to stand trial. 65 Not only had the State failed to demonstrate that
Riggins would be incompetent if not medicated, the testimony pre-
sented at the hearing on his motion to terminate the medication cast
substantial doubt on the State's assertion.66 Moreover, even if Riggins
would be incompetent absent medication, the Court reasoned that the
State erred in not considering reasonable, less intrusive alternatives,
including lowering the dosages of medication administered to Rig-
gins. 67 Concluding that a state interest sufficient to override Riggins'
substantial interest in avoiding antipsychotic medication could not be
inferred from these facts, the Supreme Court held that the trial court
erred in permitting continued administration of the drugs during
Riggins'
restrictive means of doing so. E.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504 (White, J., concurring); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 310 U.S. 535,541 (1942).
62 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814; Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221-22 (1990).
63 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814; Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22.
6.1 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814 (quoting Harper). The Supreme Court had previously recog-
nized in Winston v, Lee that individuals have an interest in bodily integrity that is protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 470 U.S. 753,755 (1985). The Winston Court held that a state could
not Force a suspect to undergo surgery to remove a bullet from the suspect's body because the
bullet was not essential to the prosecution's case. Id. at 766. According to the Court, compelled
surgery was particularly intrusive of a person's bodily integrity because it created a risk of injury
to his muscles, nerves, blood vessels and other tissue. Id. at 764. Moreover, because the examina-
tion required the use of a general anesthesia, it interfered with his thought processes. Id. at 765.
Riggins, 112 S. Gt. at 1816.
ss
67 Id. at 1815-16.
63 Id. at 1816.
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Recognizing that efforts to prove or disprove whether this error
actually prejudiced Riggins' trial would be futile, the Court focused on
the possible effects of the medication on Riggins' constitutionally pro-
tected trial rights to determine whether a new trial was warranted.°
Accordingly, the Court reviewed expert testimony offered at the hear-
ing on Riggins' motion to terminate the medication. 7° One of the
experts had testified that the dosage of medication administered to
Riggins was within the toxic range and likely to make him anxious or
nervous.71
 Another psychiatrist had claimed that Riggins was likely to
suffer from drowsiness or confusion, and a brief from the American
Psychiatric Association alleged that the level of medication adminis-
tered to Riggins could have affected his thought processes. 72
 In light
of this evidence, the Court concluded it was clearly possible that the
drugs impacted not only the substance of Riggins' testimony on di-
rect or cross examination, but also his ability to communicate with
counsel and to follow and participate in the proceedings." Moreover,
the Court reasoned that it was not necessary to decide whether the
Nevada Supreme Court was correct in holding that expert testimony
had adequately informed the jury of the effect of medication on
Riggins' demeanor during trial, because it did not cure the possible
effects of the drugs on Riggins' ability to effectuate his right to a fair
tria1. 74
The Riggins Court avoided the question of whether Nevada's need
to maintain Riggins' competency could outweigh his interest in avoid-
ing involuntary medication during his trial and, if so, under what
circumstances." Although the Court suggested that "the State might
have been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment
with the drug by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication
of Riggins' guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means,"76
 it rea-
69 Id.
71) Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See Riggins, 112 S. CL at 1815.
75 /d. The Supreme Court cited its decision in Illinois v. Allen as support for this proposition,
quoting Justice Brennan's concurring statement that "Constitutional power to bring an accused
to trial is fundamental to a scheme of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to a social justice and
peace." Id.; see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). The Allen
Court had permitted a defendant to be removed from the courtroom during his trial where,
despite repeated warnings from the judge, he persisted in disrupting his own trial. Allen, 397 U.S.
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soiled that the issue was not before the Court because the lower court
had not determined that the antipsychotic medication was necessary
to maintain Riggins' competency."
Justice Kennedy, noting that the Court remanded the case to the
lower court with little guidance of what it should consider at those
proceedings, focused his concurring opinion on the serious threat
that antipsychotic medication poses to a defendant's right to a full and
fair tria1. 78 According to Justice Kennedy, a state should not be permit-
ted to medicate a defendant for the avowed purpose of rendering
him competent to stand trial, unless it can demonstrate that the medi-
cation will not impair or alter the defendant's willingness or ability to
assist in his own defense. 79 Justice Kennedy further expressed doubt
that a state could make such a showing, given the unpredictability of
a particular individual's reaction to treatment with antipsychotic
drugs.8"
Justice Kennedy agreed that the serious due process concerns
raised by forced administration of antipsychotic drugs were not over-
come by expert testimony about the possible side effects of the medi-
cation. 8 ' in addition to not curing possible defects in Riggins' ability
and desire to assist in his own defense, Justice Kennedy reasoned that
expert testimony did not eliminate the risk of prejudice created by the
State's manipulation of Riggins' demeanor throughout his trial." Jus-
tice Kennedy noted that the jury observes an accused throughout the
entire proceedings and uses these observations to make judgments
about both his credibility and culpability." The defendant's appear-
ance and behavior, including facial expressions, mannerisms and emo-
tional responses combine to create an overall impression that may have
at 343. According to the Court, tolerating Allen's extreme and aggravated behavior would
essentially permit him to escape being tried through his own misconduct. Id. at 346. 'lb maintain
the integrity of the judicial process, the Court reasoned, a trial . judge must be given sufficient
discretion to handle disruptive and stubbornly defiant defendants—whether by removal, physical
restraint or contempt charges. Id. at 343-44.
77 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815. The six member majority also noted that "Nevada certainly
would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated and the District Court
had found that treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, consid-
ering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety of others."
Id.
78 1d. at 1817 {Kennedy,]., concurring).
79 1d. at 1818.
81)
8L See id. at 1819-20.
82 See. Ruins, 112 S. Ct. at 1819.
83 Id. at 1819-20.
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a powerful influence on his ultimate fate." Indeed, an accused's ability
to react and respond to the proceedings and his capacity to demon-
strate compassion and remorse during his trial may be determinative
of whether he lives or dies.85
On remand, the Supreme Court of Nevada ordered the lower
court to cease medicating Riggins in order to assess his competency to
stand trial in an unmedicated state." However, it permitted medication
to resume if the trial court found that antipsychotic drugs were neces-
sary and medically appropriate to maintain Riggins' competency. 87 The
Nevada Supreme Court also ordered that Riggins could be forcibly
medicated and tried under the influence of medication if the trial
court found medication necessary and appropriate to ensure the safety
of Riggins or the safety of others." One member of the Nevada panel
strenuously objected to these rulings, reasoning that Riggins should
not be medicated during his trial unless the court also established
that the drugs would not impair Riggins' ability to present a defense. 89
In summary, the United States Supreme Court failed to define the
circumstances under which a state may compel criminal defendants to
submit to antipsychotic medication during their trial. Without further
definition or guidance, the Court simply required trial courts to rec-
ognize the defendant's liberty interest in avoiding medication and to
establish that such medication is sufficiently "necessary" to override
that interest. The Nevada Supreme Court interpreted the Riggins de-
cision broadly, permitting the State to compel medication if "neces-
sary" to maintain Riggins' competence or "necessary" to maintain the
safety of the defendant or those around him. Once the medication is
deemed necessary for either purpose, neither the Supreme Court nor
the Nevada court deemed it appropriate to consider the impact of
Riggins' medicated state on his second trial. Rather, the Nevada court
apparently assumed that the State's interest in maintaining Riggins'
competence to stand trial outweighed his interests in being tried in an
unmedicated state. The Nevada court's holding likewise assumed that
Riggins' interests in being tried drug free, including his interest in a
full and fair trial, were outweighed by the State's interest in preventing
him from harming himself or others. Finally, the court's order also
suggested that the State's need to adjudicate Riggins' guilt or inno-
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1820.
86 Riggins v. State II, 860 P.2d 705, 706 (Nev. 1993).
87
 Id.
88 id.
89 Id. at 723 (Springer, J., dissenting).
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cence outweighed his liberty interest in avoiding antipsychotic medi-
cation.
II. PRE-Lb -GC/NS CHALLENGES OF FORCED MEDICATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS
Several state courts have addressed the impact of compelled medi-
cation on a defendant's ability to get a fair trial." Some have held that
the influence of the medication on a defendant's attitude, appearance
and demeanor impermissibly violates her right to present a defense
and to testify on her own behall. 91
 At least one court has also expressed
concern that forced administration of antipsychotic drugs may suf-
ficiently affect a defendant's mind to compromise her Fifth and Sixth
Amendment guarantees. 92
 Courts upholding the medication of defen-
dants against their will, on the other hand, have concluded that the
drugs actually help the defendants understand and participate in the
court proceedings." Some of these courts further recognize that preju-
dice caused by the medication may be removed by presenting expert
testimony regarding the side effects of the medication at trial." Other
courts have reasoned that although the state may try a defendant in a
medicated state, a defendant's insanity defense may require presenting
the defendant to the jury in an unmedicated state at some point in the
proceedings."
A. Upholding a Defendant's Right to be Tried Drug
-Free
In 1960, in State v. Murphy, the Supreme Court of Washington
held that a defendant has the right to appear before a court in an
unmedicated condition if his culpability is relevant to the jury's deter-
mination of his fate. 96
 In particular, the court reasoned that a jury is
likely to consider a defendant's attitude and display of remorse, or lack
thereof, when deciding whether to impose a death sentence. 97
 To fully
99 See infra notes 96-154 and accompanying text.
91 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983); State v. Maryott,
492 P.2d 239, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Murphy, 355 P.2d 323, 327 (Wash. 1960).
92 See, e.g., Maryott, 492 P.2d at 242.
' 5 See, e.g., People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787, 793 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Law, 244
S.E.2d 302, 306 (S.C. 1978); State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379, 1381 (N.H. 1978); In re Pray, 336 A.2d
174, 177 (VL 1975).
94 Law, 244 S.E.2d at 306-07.
95 See, e.g., Hayes, 389 A.2d at 1382; In re Pray, 336 A.2d at 174.
96 See Murphy, 355 P.2d at 327.
17 Id. at 326.
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defend himself, a defendant facing a death sentence must thus be
permitted to present his true demeanor to the jury during his trial."
The defendant, Murphy, was charged with first degree murder by
the State of Washington." The morning of his trial, Murphy com-
plained of a severe cold and was administered medication containing
a strong tranquilizing drug."'" Unaware of the possible effects of the
medication, Murphy proceeded to trial under the influence of the
tranquilizer and entered alternative pleas of not guilty and not guilty
by reason of insanity."'" At his trial, Murphy testified on his own behalf
and calmly admitted both to committing the crime and to being aware
that his actions were wrongful.'° 2 Following Murphy's testimony and
the testimony of two medical experts who claimed Murphy was able to
distinguish between right and wrong, the jury rejected Murphy's insan-
ity plea, convicted him of first degree murder and sentenced him to
death.'"
Murphy appealed his sentence, alleging that the State denied him
a fair trial by administering drugs which altered his appearance and
conduct during the proceedings. 104 In particular, Murphy argued that
the jury might not have imposed the death sentence if they had
witnessed his true demeanor.' 45 According to the undisputed testimony
of Murphy's counsel, Murphy's appearance, demeanor and manner of
speaking while on the witness stand were markedly different from what
they had been during pretrial interrogations.'° 6 During the trial, Mur-
phy appeared casual, cool and not at all perturbed by his criminal
acts.'°7 In contrast, Murphy's attorney testified that before the trial
Murphy was extremely distraught, nervous, agitated and reluctant to
talk about the crime.'"
The Supreme Court of Washington agreed that Murphy's seem-
ingly callous attitude towards the crime he had committed may have
been relevant to the jury's decision to sentence him to death.'" Fur-
" Id. at 327.
11° Id. at 324.
ill° Id. at 325.
1 ° 1 Murphy, 355 P.2d at 324.
1 °2 id.
1 °9 Id.
I'm Id.
1 °5 Id. at 326. Murphy did not claim that the tranquilizing drugs affected the content of his
testimony nor that the influence of the drugs had any bearing on the jury's guilty verdict. Id.
I" Murphy, 355 P.2d at 326.
nn Id.
me Id.
1°
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thermore, because Murphy's right to a fair trial required the jury to
consider all relevant evidence when making this life and death deci-
sion, the court reasoned that it was not necessary for Murphy to
demonstrate that a drug induced change in his demeanor actually
impacted the jury's decision."° Rather, a new trial was justified because
the State's administration of tranquilizing drugs to Murphy without his
awareness of their possible effects created a reasonable possibility that
Murphy's demeanor was substantially influenced by circumstances be-
yond his control."'
In 1971, in State v. Maryott, the Washington Court of Appeals
recognized that a defendant's right to be tried in an unmedicatecl state
is particularly compelling where the defendant's mental capacity to
commit the crime is at issue. 112 The court reasoned that when a defen-
dant claims he was not responsible for his actions by reason of insanity,
his attitude and demeanor may be the most significant evidence he
could present to the jury." 3 Permitting the State to alter this evidence
by medicating him could thus seriously compromise his ability to
present his defense," 4
Maryott was forcibly administered substantial doses of various seda-
tives and a weak antipsychotic throughout his trial, despite significant
evidence that the medication affected his mental ability." 6
 Expert tes-
timony presented at his trial indicated that the dosages of medication
administered to Maryott were sufficient to effect his thought processes,
expression and mannerisms before the court."'' This evidence was
supported by a friend's testimony that Maryott was dull and listless and
unlike his usual self during trial.'" Other evidence indicated that he
sat hunched over, staring vacantly ahead throughout the proceedings,
and, according to his attorney, he was "suspicious and uncommunica-
tive and refused to assist in his own defense."" 6 Regardless, Maryott
was tried while under the influence of the medication and convicted
of robbery and first-degree murder." 9
1 I 0 Id. at 327.
In Murphy, 355 P.2d at 326.
12 State v. Maryott, 492 P.2d 239, 240, 242 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
"'Id. at 242.
114 .m.
115 Id. at 240. Although the court noted that the drugs could have affected Maryotes thought
processes, it concluded there was sufficient evidence that Maryott was capable of understanding
the proceedings. Id. at 244.
116 1d. at 240.
117 Maryott, 492 P.2d at 240.
118 1d.
ns
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The Washington Court of Appeals reversed Maryott's conviction,
concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed him the right
to be tried with his mental faculties unfettered. 12° According to the
court, freedom from state control of one's mind during trial is essential
to the adversary process "whereby the state and the defendant, by
contending vigorously but fairly against each other, are able to present
the total factual and legal issues from which a trier of fact may arrive
at a decision."' 2 ' Permitting the State to control the judgment and
capacity of its own adversary by administering him mind-altering drugs
would substantially undermine this process.' 22
The court reasoned that, when a defendant is offering an insan-
ity defense, state control of a defendant's mental capacity is particu-
larly offensive because it also enables the state to manipulate and
control evidence which is crucial to that defendant's case.' 23 According
to the court, the defendant's demeanor, attitude and appearance dur-
ing his trial were probative evidence of his mental state at the time of
the crime and could not be replaced by expert testimony that it was
altered by medication.' 24 The State could not exclude the most reli-
able evidence of Maryott's true mental state and then compensate for
this loss by explaining to the jury what it refused to let them witness
firsthand.' 25
In 1983, in Commonwealth v. Louraine, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts also recognized that a defendant pleading not guilty
by reason of insanity has the right to be tried in an unmedicated
state.' 26
 Louraine was given large doses of antipsychotic medication to
control symptoms of schizophrenia throughout both his pretrial de-
tention and his trial for murder.' 27
 Prior to his trial, Louraine asked
the court to terminate the medication so that he could present his true
demeanor to the jury as part of his insanity defense.' 28
 Although the
trial judge found that the medication administered to Louraine re-
duced his alertness and ability to concentrate, he ruled that the defen-
dant was not entitled to be tried in an unmedicated condition, reason-
ing instead that expert testimony could adequately inform the jury
12° See id. at 242.
121 /d. at 241.
122
 See Maryott, 492 P.2(.1 at 241.
123
 Id. at 242.
124
 Id. at 243.
125
126
 Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983).
127 Id. at 441.
128 Id.
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of the effects of the medication on his demeanor.'" Subsequently,
Louraine proceeded through trial under the influence of medication
and was convicted of first degree murder.'"
Louraine appealed his conviction to the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, alleging the trial court deprived him of the opportu-
nity to present his version of the facts by medicating him against his
will during the trial.' 3 ' The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the
defendant, reasoning that expert testimony regarding the effects of
medication neither eliminated prejudice caused by the defendant's
altered demeanor nor replaced the probative value that his true de-
meanor might provide to his insanity defense.'" According to the
court, the jury was likely to assess any evidence Louraine put before it
with reference to his attitude and conduct in court, regardless of expert
testimony that it was altered by medication.'" For example, if Louraine
appeared calm and controlled at the trial, the jury would likely reject
testimony that he lacked the capacity to understand the wrongfulness
of his condiict during the crime. 1 '4
 Allowing the State to forcibly medi-
cate the defendant thus enabled the State to manipulate and control
the evidence presented to the jury, compromising the jury's role as the
sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence.'"
B. Upholding a State's Right to Medicate Incompetent Defendants
In contrast to the Washington and Massachusetts courts, in 1978,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the compelled medica-
tion of a defendant whose only defense was a plea of insanity.'" The
defendant in State v. Law was administered antipsychotic drugs solely
for the purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial.'" He was
then tried in this medicated state, convicted of murder and sentenced
to death.'"
The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld his conviction on
appeal, concluding that the medication neither undermined his insan-
129 Id. at 441 n.7.
130 Id. at 439.
13E See Louraine, 453 N.E.2d at 441,
152 id. at 442.
i;,es hi.
151 id.
L35
Im'State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 308 (S.C. 1978). See also supra notes 96-135 and accompa-
nying text.
157 See Law, 244 S.E.2d at 305.
1 mid. at 303.
G96	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 35:681
ity defense nor violated his due process guarantees.'" The South Caro-
lina court distinguished the Maryott decision based on the effects
of the medication administered to the defendant.'" In contrast to
Maryott's dull, listless and uncommunicative demeanor, the court found
the medication administered to Law countered the effects of his men-
tal illness, calming him and improving his ability to comprehend and
participate in the proceedings against him."' The court thus reasoned
that the medication enabled Law to exercise the very rights which he
asserted he had been denied.' 42
The court also rejected Law's contention that the effect of the
medication on his demeanor denied him the right to fully present his
insanity defense.'" The court reasoned that expert testimony suffi-
ciently informed the jury that Law's calm demeanor during trial was
the result of medication and not reflective of his state of mind at the
time of the crime.'" Moreover, any remaining prejudice was eliminated
by instructing the jury that Law's criminal responsibility was governed
by his mental state at the time of the alleged criminal acts, not his
present condition.'"
In 1984, in People v. Hardesty, the Court of Appeals of Michigan
also upheld the compelled medication of a defendant. 14" Like the
South Carolina court, the Michigan court found that the drugs en-
hanced the defendant's ability to assist his counsel at trial.' 47 In con-
trast, however, the Hardesty court concluded that a court must examine
the probative value of the defendant's true demeanor before deter-
mining whether expert testimony is an adequate substitute.'" In the
instant case, because Hardesty had been under the influence of antip-
sychotic drugs when he committed the crime, the court reasoned that
his unmedicated demeanor was of little probative value to the jury. 14'9
Therefore, the court concluded that Michigan had lawfully and jus-
tifiably medicated Hardesty during his trial.'"
139 Id. at 306.
140 m.
141 id.
142 Law, 244 S.E.2d at 306.
143 1d.
144 1d.
145,
146 People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787, 797 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
147 1d. at 793.
118 Id. at 797.
199 id.
15° Id. at 798.
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The courts in New Hampshire and Vermont, although permitting
the State to try defendants under the influence of unwanted medica-
tion, both recognize that a defendant's insanity defense may require
exposing him to the jury drug-free.'" Like the South Carolina court,
these courts have found that compelled medication can have a bene-
ficial effect on defendants' ability to function during their trials. 152 In
contrast, however, they do not agree that expert testimony could re-
place the probative value of a defendant's unmedicated demeanor.'"
Instead, these courts have held that a defendant's right to present a
defense includes the right to permit the jury to view him in the same
condition he was in when he committed the crime.'"
In conclusion, the state courts disagree about whether the com-
pelled medication of defendants impermissibly violates their right to a
full and fair trial. Several courts have recognized that an insanity
defendant's attitude and conduct in court are so crucial to her right
to present a defense that a defendant pleading not guilty by reason of
insanity has an absolute right to be tried in an unmedicated state.
Other courts, although not recognizing a defendant's right to be tried
while unmedicated, have still reasoned that a defendant's insanity
defense may require presenting her to the jury in an unmedicated
state. At the very least, the courts addressing the compelled medication
of defendants have agreed that their demeanor at trial is probative
evidence of their mental state at the time of committing the crime, and
that the jury must therefore be informed of a defendant's medication
and its possible effects on her behavior.
III. EFFECTS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION
Any rational discussion of the impact of forced medication on
either a defendant's liberty interests or her right to obtain a fair trial
must address both the desired and undesired effects of antipsychotic
medication. The beneficial aspects of these drugs and the degree to
which both their useful and harmful effects can be predicted bears
heavily on their effectiveness at furthering the state's interests in forc-
ing medication.'" The toxic side effects, particularly those causing
151 See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.H. 1978); In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174, 174
(Vt. 1975).
152 See, e.g, Hayes, 389 A.2d at 1381; In re. Pray, 336 A.2d at 177.
153 See, e.g., Hayes, 389 A.2d at 1382; In re Pray, 336 A.2d at 177.
154 See, e.g., Hayes, 389 A.2(1 at 1382; In re Pray, 336 A,2(1 at 174.
155 See infra notes 309-10 and accompanying text.
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severe discomfort, distress or risk of permanent injury establish the
intrusiveness of the drug on the defendant's liberty interest.' 56
 Com-
plications affecting the defendant's thought processes, appearance and
attitude are particularly relevant to her right to receive a fair trial, as
is the predictability and consistency of any beneficial effects. 157
The use of antipsychotic medication to "treat" psychiatric disor-
ders increased rapidly in the 1950s and has remained steady to this
day. 15" Despite almost four decades of research and clinical studies,
however, there is still no generally accepted theory on how the drugs
achieve their claimed effects on mental illness,' 59
 nor is there agree-
ment as to the precise mental conditions for which treatment with the
drugs is effective. 160
 What psychiatrists and clinicians do agree on is
that antipsychotic drugs do not cure mental illness, and, indeed, pro-
vide no beneficial effect upon patients beyond the time they are in the
blood stream. 16 '
Although there is evidence that antipsychotic drugs alleviate the
symptoms of certain psychiatric conditions, their effectiveness varies
from condition to condition, symptom to symptom and patient to
patient. 162
 Because these variations often appear idiosyncratic and even
paradoxical, psychiatrists are unable to predict the effectiveness of a
particular drug on a particular patient.' 63
 Thus, they generally pre-
scribe antipsychotic medication based on "custom and rumored re-
pute" rather than specific knowledge, or even belief, that the drug will
benefit the patient.'64
 The proper dosage of the medication is likewise
a product of guess work; the amount administered to a patient is
adjusted upwards until he or she either responds or develops toxic
symptoms.' 65
 Although this trial and error method of choosing medi-
cation may eventually produce desired results, any success is likely to
156 Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1814 (1992).
157 See infra notes 225-38 and accompanying text.
158 Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment,
72 Nw. U. L. REV. 461, 461 (1977); see also Lawrence D. Gaughan & Lewis H. LaRue, The Right
of a Mental Patient to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs in an Institution, 4 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 43, 47
(1978).
155 E.g., Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 47 (1978); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915,
927 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
161'E.g., Plotkin, supra note 158, at 475; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 48.
161 E.g., Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 47-48; State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 305 (S.C.
1978); see also Plotkin, supra note 158, at 478.
162 E.g., Plotkin, supra, note 158, at 474-75; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 49, 51.
163
 E.g., Plotkin, supra note 158, at 474-75; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 49.
164 E.g., Plotkin, supra note 158, at 475; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 54.
165 E.g., Plotkin, supra note 158, at 475; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 54.
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be short lived, because an individual's response to a particular drug
tends to vary over time.'"
One of the most frequent effects of antipsychotic drugs, also
commonly known as major tranquilizers, is pronounced sedation.' 67
The drugs reduce patients' psychotic symptoms by chemically dulling
their thought processes and flattening their emotional responses.'"
Highly agitated and excited patients become docile and apathetic;
ranting and raving is replaced by apparent peace and tranquility.'"
While many psychiatrists may view such control of a patient's psycho-
logical disturbances as beneficial,'" many opponents of the medication
consider it a "chemical lobotomy." 171 Indeed, the medical literature
frequently uses the term "zombie" to describe the behavior and appear-
ance of patients under the influence of antipsychotic drugs.'72 Com-
mentators likewise describe "synthetically sane" patients as bored, le-
thargic and indifferent to what is going on around them. 173
 The patients
themselves complain of being drowsy, confused and unable to stay
awake or think clearly.' 74
While the benefit a patient will gain from antipsychotic medica-
tion is difficult to predict, it is almost certain that she will suffer from
some of the unpleasant "toxic" effects of the drugs.' 75
 According to
commentators, the side effects of antipsychotic drugs are as varied and
serious as any drug approved for use in the United States.'" Medicated
patients frequently complain of dizziness, blurred vision, dry mouth
and throat, nasal congestion, urinary retention, constipation, sexual
dysfunction and other painful or distressing minor reactions to the
drugs. 177
 Other common side effects include temporary muscular dis-
166 Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 53.
167 E.g., Plotkin, supra note 158, at 474 n.75; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 51.
168 Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 46; Riggins v. State I, 808 P.2d 535, 540 (Nev. 1991)
(Springer, J., dissenting); see also Plotkin, supra note 158, at. 474 n.75.
16° Riggins v. Slate I, 808 P.2d at 540 (Springer, J., dissenting); see also Plotkin, supra note
158, at 474 n.75.
17° See Gaughan & LaRue, supra nute 158, at 51; Plotkin, supra note 158, at 477.
Riggins v. State I, 808 P.2d at 540 (Springer, J., dissenting).
172 /d.
178
	 Comment, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administration of Psychoiropic Drugs,
1980 Wis. L. REV. 497, 512 (1980).
174 E.g., Plotkin, supra note 158, at 474 n.75; Gaughan LaRue, supra note 158, at 5!.
175 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 239 n.5 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Plotkin, supra note 158, at 475; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 48.
176 Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 48.
177
 E.g., Plotkin, supra note 158, at 476; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 51-52; Haapar
494 U.S. at 240 (Stevens,,]., dissenting).
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turbances such as a rigid gait, motor retardation, tremors or a mask-like
face, and certain dystonic reactions such as irregular writhing and
grimacing or involuntary spasms of the upper body, tongue, throat or
eyes, and symptoms of akathesia, including restlessness, agitation and
non-rhythmic motion of the hands and feet. 178 Because many of these
involuntary movements and behaviors are grotesque or socially objec-
tionable, they cause embarrassment and distress for both the patient
and her family.' 79
The side effects of antipsychotic drugs increase in frequency and
severity if the medication is administered for an extensive length of
time.'8° Among the more serious and distressful side effects is tardive
dyskinesia, a condition characterized by involuntary movement of a
patient's jaw, mouth and facial muscles.' 81 In some cases, tardive dyski-
nesia also causes the involuntary movement of a person's extremities
and pelvic area, and, in its most progressive state, it interferes with
all motor activity,'" making speech incomprehensible and breathing
difficult.'" In the most extreme cases, antipsychotic drugs have in-
duced catatonic-like states, brain swelling,' 84 and neuroleptic malignant
syndrome, a cardiac dysfunction which can lead to death. 185
In conclusion, while there is disagreement over the severity of
some of the minor side effects and the frequency of the more severe
disturbances, it is not disputed that a long list of possible complications
accompanies the use of antipsychotic medication.'" While many of the
178 E.g., Plotkin, supra note 158, at 475; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 52.
179 Plotkin, supra note 158, at 477. An even better understanding of the effects of antipsy-
chotic drugs on patients can be gained from the statements of persons forced to submit to these
drugs. For example, during hearings to compel medication to the defendant in Harper, the
defendant stated that he "would rather die th[a]n take medication." 494 U.S. at 239 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Other trial testimony quoted Harper as saying: "well all you want to do is medicate
me and you've been medicating me .... Haldol paral[y]zed my right side of my body .... [Y]ou
are burning me out of my life .... [Y]ou are burning me out of my freedom." Id. at '239 n.4
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Commentators Gaughan and LaRue quote a patient at Western State
Hospital as follows: "Medication makes me weak, tired, hard to swallow, blurry vision, dry mouth
and throat, AFRAID to getting addicted to medicine, AFRAID of withdrawal symptoms, needs to
go to school, have been a good patient, haven't been any trouble, well behaved." Gaughan &
LaRue, .supra note 158, at 51 n.30.
Isu E.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 240; Plotkin, supra note 158, at 477; see also Gaughan & LaRue,
supra note 158, at 52, 53.
181 E.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 229-30; Plotkin, supra note 158, at 476; Gaughan & LaRue, supra
note 158, at 52.
112 Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Stipp. 915, 929 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
183 E.g., Davis, 506 F. Stipp, at 929; Plotkin, supra note 158, at 477.
184 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 229-30.
1811 Plotkin, supra note 158, at 478; see also Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 48, 51.
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minor side effects may be controllable with other medication and tend
to disappear soon after the antipsychotic drugs are discontinued, the
more severe effects have resisted curative measures and often persist
for years after the medication is stopped.' 87 Moreover, although the
more severe effects generally result after an extended period of medi-
cation, ceasing medication before the side effect develops does not
ensure that a patient is free from risk, because symptoms of tardive
dyskinesia have been known to appear some time after medication has
been discontinued.' 88
IV. CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A FULL AND
FAIR TRIAL
Forceful administration of mind-altering drugs can prejudice a
defendant's trial in two principal ways. First, it may render him unable
or unwilling to assist in his own defense. Second, the medication may
compromise his ability to present an insanity defense by altering his
reactions and presentation in the courtroom.
A. The Right to Present a Defense
In 1947, in In re Oliver; the United States Supreme Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees defen-
dants the right to be heard in their own defense. 1 e" Oliver involved the
immediate conviction and sentencing of a witness charged with con-
tempt during a secret investigation of gambling and corruption in
a Michigan court.'" After Oliver testified, the judge concluded that
Oliver's story was false because it conflicted with the testimony of
another secret witness.''' Based on this conclusion, the judge charged
Oliver with contempt of court and immediately convicted and sen-
tenced him to two months in jail. 192 Due to the secrecy and haste of
the proceedings, Oliver had neither the opportunity to obtain counsel,
to prepare a defense, to cross-examine the other witness or to summon
witnesses in his own behalf.'"
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the United States Supreme
Court reversed Oliver's conviction, holding that the Michigan court
187 Plotkin, supra note 158, at 477; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 52.
188 Plotkin, supra note 158, at 476.
188 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
180 Id. at 259.
191 Id.
102 hi .
188 a
702	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:681
deprived Oliver of his liberty without providing him due process of
law.'" According to the Court, a person's right to reasonable notice of
a charge against him and an opportunity to be heard in his defense
are basic to our system of jurisprudence.'" At a minimum, the Michi-
gan court should have granted Oliver the opportunity to examine the
witness against him, to confer with counsel and to offer testimony in
his own behalf.' 96
in 1985, in Rock v. Arkansas, the United States Supreme Court
held that a defendant's right to testify was essential to her right to
present a defense.' 97 The defendant in Rock was charged with man-
slaughter in the death of her husband.' 99 Although the defendant
admitted that she and her husband had been arguing on the night of
the alleged shooting and that she had picked up a gun, she could not
recall any additional details.'" At the suggestion of her attorney, the
defendant submitted to hypnosis to refresh her memory and sub-
sequently recalled that her thumb was on the hammer of the gun at
the time of the incident, but that she had not touched the trigger. 2"
Rather, the gun had discharged accidentally when her husband grabbed
her arm."'
At trial, the Arkansas court granted the prosecution's motion to
exclude Rock's hypnotically refreshed testimony and ordered the de-
fendant to limit her testimony to statements made prior to hypnosis. 202
At the close of her trial, the jury convicted Rock of manslaughter. 203
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld Rock's conviction,
concluding the trial court properly excluded her hypnotically refreshed
testimony because of its inherent unreliability."'
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Arkansas court's
ruling, holding that Rock had a protected right to state her own
1 " Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273.
195 Id.
196 Id. Since then, the Supreme Court has extended a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
protections to trials in state courts through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
merit. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1966). The Sixth Amendment grants criminal
defendants the right to "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsr., amend. Vl.
197 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,51-53 (1986).
199 Id. at 45.
199 Id. at 46.
2°0 Id. at 46-47.
201 Id. at 47.
2°2 Rock, 483 U.S. at 47.
"Id. at 48.
209 See Rock v. Arkansas, 708 S.W.2d 78,81 (1986).
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version of the facts, regardless of the possibility that her testimony
might be unreliable.'" The Court found this right encompassed in
several constitutional provisions.'" First, Rock's ability to testify was
essential to her Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses in her
own behalf."" Rock was undoubtedly the most important witness for
the defense; she was the only one present at the alleged crime, and
thus, the only one with testimony which was both material and favor-
able to her side of the dispute. 2"8
 Rock's right to confront her accusers
and to defend herself likewise required that she be permitted to fully
testify about the events surrounding the crime of which she was ac-
cused. 2"9
 Her refreshed memory that the gun discharged accidentally
was her only defense against accusations that she had murdered her
husband."°
Silencing this testimony also violated Rock's Fifth Amendment
guarantee against compelled self incrimination.'" Rock admitted to
arguing with her husband and picking up the murder weapon, admis-
sions which would necessarily implicate her in his murder absent some
valid defense or exculpatory evidence."' The Rock Court reasoned that
the importance of Rock's right to fully testify about the events sur-
rounding her husband's death was not lessened simply because her
hypnotically refreshed testimony risked being untrustworthy. 2 "/ Rather,
judging the credibility of a witness' testimony is a traditional function
of the jury, and any lack of trustworthiness goes to the weight of the
evidence rather than its admissibility. 214
B. The Right to Understand and Participate in the Proceedings
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that
a defendant's right to a fair trial requires that she have the mental
capacity to understand and participate in the proceedings against her."'
A state may not try or punish a defendant absent this capacity, because
she would not be able to confront her accusers in a meaningful man-
2°5 See Rock, 483 U.S. at 61.
206
 See id. at 51-52.
207 1d, at 52.
258 Id.
2" Id.
210 See Roth, 483 U.S. at 52.
211
212 See id.
213 Id. at Gl.
21a
215
 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1974) (defendant's right to a fair trial includes
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ner, coherently present her own version of the facts or otherwise
adequately defend herself."' In 1960, in Dusky v. United States, the
Court defined the inquiry for sufficient mental capacity, or compe-
tency, as whether a defendant could consult rationally with his attorney
and whether he had a rational as well as a factual understanding of
the proceedings. 2 t 7
 The court below had determined that the defen-
dant was competent to stand trial because he was reasonably oriented
to time and place and had some recollection of past events."' The
Supreme Court overturned his subsequent conviction, reasoning that
the trial court's findings did not adequately ensure that the defendant
had sufficient mental capacity to effectuate his constitutional protec-
tions."'
Commentators suggest that proceeding against individuals who
cannot defend themselves damages society's perception of the fairness
of the criminal system,22° thereby hindering its effectiveness in deter-
ring crime. 22 ' Because the criminal defendant's life and liberty are at
stake, the apparent fairness of a proceeding depends largely on the
defendant's ability to control the nature of her defense. 222 Thus, it is
imperative that she be able to consult with an attorney, choose how to
plead and assist in basic strategic decisions.'" To make such decisions
having the mental capacity to consult with counsel and assist in one's defense); Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 374, 377 (1966) (same); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (same).
216 See Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. CL 1810, 1817 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Note,
Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454, 458 (1967) (hereinafter Harvard Note]. This
prohibition against the trial and punishment of incompetent defendants was well established in
eighteenth century English jurisprudence and transformed almost verbatim into American com-
mon law during the nineteenth century. Ira Mickenberg, Competency to Stand Trial and the
Mentally Retarded Defendant: The Need for a Multi
-Disciplinary Problem, 17 CAL. W. L. REV. 365,
367 n.9 (1981). Since then the doctrine has been codified in federal and state statutes. 18 U.S.C.
§ 4241 (Stipp. 1984). See Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking Competency
to Stand Trial in Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1115
(1986) for a compilation of state competency statutes. It has also been encompassed in the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 388. This prohibition has survived nearly
intact for over two hundred years because it is firmly rooted in principles of fundamental fairness
and humanity. Not only is it senseless to punish individuals who cannot understand what they
have done wrong or why they are being punished, it is inherently unfair to try them if they are
mentally incapable of defending themselves. Harvard Note, supra at 454.
217 Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
2IB
219 See id. at 403.
220 See, e.g., Harvard Note, supra note 216, at 458.
221 See Mickenberg, supra note 216, at 369; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL jusTICE 7.4.1,
commentary 170, at 161 (1984) [hereinafter ABA Standards].
222 See Harvard Note, supra note 216, at 458.
229 See id.
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rationally, the defendant must be able to understand the charges against
her, as well as the defenses available and the possible consequences of
those defenses.'"
C. The Impact of Antipsychotic Medication
The threat that antipsychotic drugs pose to a defendant's ability
to defend herself is substantial. As discussed earlier, although the
medication may reduce the symptoms of a defendant's psychosis, it
does not restore "normal" lucidity. Rather, a medicated defendant is
likely to be drowsy, confused and unable to concentrate or think
clearly. Such mental impairment could not only affect a defendant's
ability to follow and understand the proceedings against her, it could
also compromise her interactions with her attorney. 225
Even if we assume that this impairment is insufficient to violate a
defendant's due process guarantees, and that medication instead re-
stores a sufficient level of competency to enable a defendant to stand
trial, 226
 the possible effect of the medication on her will to think and
fend for herself is alarming. Common sense alone dictates that a
heavily sedated, zombie-like defendant will lack the will power and
tenacity to vigorously confront her accusers. This lackadaisical attitude
is particularly troubling when it is induced by the state and approved
by the court. In In re Pray, the Supreme Court of Vermont found that
antipsychotic medication was beneficial because it rendered the defen-
dant "quiet and tractable." 227
 It is difficult to understand how the court
could find that rendering one's adversary "easily led," "manageable,"
"governable" or "malleable" 228 comports with due process notions of
justice.
State manipulation and control of a defendant's behavior is even
more disturbing when the defendant is pleading not guilty by reason
of insanity. 229
 An insanity defendant often admits to committing the
crime, but claims that she lacked the requisite mental capacity to be
224 See id.
225 Riggins v. Nevada, I l2 S. Ct. 1810, 1816 (1992).
226 This also requires an assumption that the effect of medication on a defendant's ability to
understand and participate in the proceedings can be maintained throughout her trial. See supra
note 166 and accompanying text.
227 In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (Vt. 1975).
22R See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2421 (3rd ed. 1986) (defining
tractable).
222
 See, e.g., Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Louraine,
453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983); State v. Maryou, 492 P.2c1 230, 242 (Wash. Ct.. App. 1971),
706	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:681
held responsible for her actions. 23° Thus, because her guilt or inno-
cence depends solely on the jury's determination of her mental state
at the time of the crime, it is essential that she present all relevant
evidence of her mental capacity. Most courts reviewing compelled
medication have recognized that a defendant's present mental state is
probative of her state of mind at the time of committing the crime."
Moreover, many have noted that it is likely to be the most reliable
evidence available." 2
When the state forcibly medicates a defendant, it does not simply
manipulate this evidence, it literally destroys it. The avowed purpose
of antipsychotic drugs is to make a person look and act sane. 2" An
artificially sane defendant cannot present herself to the jury as proba-
tive evidence of her insanity at the time of committing the crime—that
mental state no longer exists.
Forcefully administering mind-altering drugs likewise prevents the
defendant from testifying in her own words. Rather, any testimony she
presents will be a byproduct of her chemically-controlled mental proc-
esses. Even if the substance of her testimony remains unchanged, the
context and impact of her words will be altered. The outward signs of
her insanity, as well as any emotional displays of grief, compassion or
remorse may be deleted from her testimony. 2"9
 Her apparent sanity in
the courtroom might also affect the credibility and weight the jury
attaches to her testimony, particularly any statements regarding her
capacity to understand the wrongfulness of her actions."
Altering an insanity defendant's mental state also risks violating
her right against self incrimination in the same manner that excluding
hypnotically refreshed testimony violated Rock's Fifth Amendment
rights."6
 Like Rock's refreshed testimony, an insanity defendant's pre-
sent mental state might be the only evidence both material and favor-
able to her defense. Destroying this evidence would thus cause any
admissions she had made to necessarily implicate her in committing
the crime.
23° See, e.g., Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1813; Maryatt, 492 P.2d at 240.
"I See, e.g., l'eople v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787,795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Maryolt, 492 1'.2d
at 242.
232 See, e.g., Maryati, 492 P.2d at 243; Louraine, 453 N.E.2d at 442.
295
	 Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 158, at 48.
234 See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
235 See, e.g., RiArins, 112 S. Ct. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lou rains, 453 N.E.2d at 442.
2" See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
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Because the insanity defendant's unmedicated demeanor is the
most direct evidence of her mental capacity to commit the crime, it is
essential that the jury view this evidence for themselves. 237 Although a
psychiatrist may be able to give his opinion of a defendant's mental
state and her capacity to distinguish right from wrong, it cannot re-
place the jury's evaluation of the defendant's true mental state. It is
the jury, not the psychiatrist, who need to judge the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of evidence.
Although evidence of the defendant's true mental capacity could
be provided by temporarily presenting the defendant to the jury in an
unmedicated state, this measure would not replace the value of per-
mitting the jury to view the defendant's true demeanor throughout
her trial. 238 After viewing a calm, apparently sane defendant day after
day, the jury is likely to view the defendant's bizarre unmedicated
demeanor as merely an act concocted by the defendant as a means of
escaping responsibility for her actions. The defendant's lack of com-
passion, remorse or other emotional response during the trial might
also prejudice the jury's assessment of her guilt, regardless of their
knowledge that it is medically induced. Moreover, temporarily present-
ing an unmedicated defendant to the jury does not cure the other
major concern raised by the compelled medication of a defendant
during trial, namely that the state is still controlling the mind and will
of its adversary.
Finally, proceeding against an insanity defendant whose compe-
tence to stand trial has been restored by forceful administration of
antipsychotic medication presents at least as grave a risk to society's
perception of the criminal justice system as trying her in an incompe-
tent state. The threat the drugs pose to her ability to fully and fairly
defend herself is, in itself, substantial. Moreover, because this threat is
induced by the state, it raises serious concerns of misconduct and
overreaching by the state. Likewise, because this threat to the defen-
dant's due process guarantees is approved by the court, it creates, at a
minimum, the appearance of complicity between the judiciary and the
state prosecutors. Our judicial system long ago concluded that it could
not tolerate the degradation of respect for the system which would
result from trying incompetent defendants. The wisdom and foresight
2" See Louraine, 453 N.E.2d at 442-43; Maryoti, 492 P.2d at 242-43.
258 See, e.g., Riggins, 1 12 S. Ct. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Louraine, 453 N.E.2d at
442.
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of this intolerance is equally applicable to the trial of their forcefully
medicated counterparts.
V. OVERRIDING AN INDIVIDUAL'S LIBERTY INTEREST IN AVOIDING
UNWANTED MEDICATION
Regardless of the impact of antipsychotic drugs on a defendant's
trial, forceful administration of the medication is an intrusion on her
substantial liberty interest in avoiding potentially harmful, mind-alter-
ing drugs. 229 Whether the state may override her right to be free from
unwanted medication can be determined only after identifying the
legitimate interests of the state and balancing those interests against
the defendant's interests in avoiding the drugs. 2" The courts have
generally only recognized two state interests that may, in limited cir-
cumstances, be sufficiently compelling to justify the forced medication
of mentally ill persons involuntarily committed to state institutions.24 '
The first justification, the state's parens patriae right and duty to treat
individuals committed to its care, is premised on the benefit of the
medication to the mentally ill person. 242 The second justification, the
state's duty to prevent mentally ill persons from injuring themselves
and others, arises out of the state's police power. 243 Moreover, where
the state is seeking to medicate an inmate committed to a state correc-
tional facility, the United States Supreme Court has held that the state's
interest in maintaining safety and security in the prison setting is
sufficiently compelling to outweigh even substantial interests of inma-
tes.244
A. Involuntarily Committed Mentally Ill Patients: Parens Patriae and
Police Power Justifications
In 1980, in Davis v. Hubbard, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio reviewed the forceful administration of
antipsychotic drugs to involuntarily committed mentally ill patients
and concluded that patients retain a limited right to refuse the medi-
cation.2" The district court reasoned that the forced administration of
239 See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915,934 (N.D. Ohio 1980); see also Riggins, 112 S. Ct.
at 1814-15; Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221 (1990).
'Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 934; see also Biggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815-16.
241 E.g., Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 934-35; Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489,510-12 (1983).
242 Davis, 506 P. Supp. at 935; Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511-12.
243 Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 934; Rogers, 390 Mass. at 510-11.
244 Harper, 494 U.S. at 223-24,236.
245 Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 938.
May 19941	 FORCED	 709
antipsychotic drugs not only represents an extreme invasion of the
patients' significant liberty interests in avoiding unwanted medica-
tion, 24t' it also denies their right to make their own treatment decisions
and implicates their interest in being able to think and communicate
freely. 247 According to the court, a state's interest in medicating a
patient is sufficiently compelling to override these substantial interests
only if the patient presents an immediate danger to herself or others
in the institution. 248
The plaintiffs in Davis were mental patients at Lima State Hospital
("LSH"), an Ohio mental institution."" LSH had a policy of liberally
medicating patients with antipsychotic drugs; approximately 73% of
the hospital's patients received antipsychotic medication on a daily
basis. 25" Dissatisfied with the hospital's policy, a group of LSH patients
challenged it in the district court, claiming that compelled medication
violated their right to refuse unwanted medication. 25 '
The State of Ohio sought to justify its compulsory treatment of
patients under its parens palriae powers. 252 Although the court agreed
that the State had a legitimate interest in "providing care to its citizens
who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves,"
it did not agree that this interest justified the wholesale medication of
mentally ill persons confined in state institutions. 255 Rather, the court
concluded that a state's parens patriae powers are, by definition, con-
ditioned on the patient's ability to care for himself and to make his
own decisions about whether to accept or reject treatment. 254 Because
commitment to a state mental institution did not automatically imply
incompetence to make treatment decisions, 255 the State could not fore-
246 Id. at 929, 934.
247 1d. at 930.
243 M. at 938.
245 1d. at 926.
25°Davis, 506 F Stipp. at 926. This widespread administration of medication was not neces-
sarily related to treatment purposes; the drugs were often prescribed solely to control or punish
the patients. Id. Moreover, LSH patients who were medicated with antipsychotic drugs were rarely
informed of the type of drugs administered, the reason they were prescribed or the possible risks
of the drug, nor were they given the opportunity to refuse treatment. M at 027.
251 Id. at 925.
252 Id. at 935 .
253 1d.
254 „rd.
255 Davis, 506 F. Stipp. at 935. The court concluded that Ohio law did not equate commitment
with incompetence to make treatment decisions because the Ohio code provides involuntarily
committed patients the right to refuse other forms of treatment. Id. at 935 n.26. The commitment
laws of most other states similarly recognize that institutionalization does nut represent a deter-
mination of incompetency. Plotkin, supra note 158, at 496.
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ibly medicate patients for treatment purposes absent a finding that the
patient is incapable of deciding what is good for him or herself. 256
The district court expressed doubt that the State could justify
compelling antipsychotic drugs for treatment purposes even if the pa-
tient was deemed incompetent to make her own medical decisions. 257
To override a patient's fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic medi-
cation, a state must demonstrate that the drugs substantially further
the state's alleged treatment goa1. 258 Because antipsychotic drugs lack
any curative effect and because their ability to alleviate symptoms is
uncertain, the court concluded that a state would have difficulty estab-
lishing such a connection. 259 Moreover, the court noted that the hostile
environment created by the forced administration of drugs further
reduced their therapeutic value by destroying the relationship of trust
between psychiatrist and patient. 26°
The State of Ohio also suggested that forced medication may
sometimes be necessary to prevent a patient from harming himself or
others.261 Although the court agreed that this was a legitimate interest,
it reasoned that it is only sufficiently compelling to override a patient's
significant interest in refusing the antipsychotic drugs under narrow
circumstances. 262 Wholesale medication of patients based on past vio-
lent behavior or possible violent tendencies would sweep too broadly,
the court concluded, because many, if not most, patients in mental
hospitals have exhibited violent tendencies at some point in time. 263
Rather, at a minimum, a state must have probable cause to believe that
the patient presents an imminent threat of danger to himself, other
patients or the institution's staff, before it may disregard the patient's
interests in refusing treatment:264
In 1984, in Rogers v. Commissioner, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts also recognized that involuntarily committed patients
retain a qualified right to refuse treatment. 265 Rogers involved a class
action challenge of a state hospital's policy of administering antipsy-
256 Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 936. Other courts have similarly recognized an involuntary psychi-
atric patient's right to refuse treatment absent a finding of incompetency. E.g., Scott v. Plante,
532 F.2d 939, 946 (3rd Cir. 1976); Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489, 494-97 (1983).
257 Davis, 506 E Supp. at 936-37.
258 Id.
259 Id.
266
 Id. at 936,
261 Id. at 934.
262 Davis, 506 E Supp. at 934.
263 Id. at 935.
264 1d.
265 Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489, 491 (1983).
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chotic medication to patients against their will. 265 Like the Ohio district
court, the Massachusetts court held that the State's police powers only
justified forceful medication if the patient posed an immediate threat
of harm to herself or others. 257 Additionally, the Massachusetts court
required that the State consider less intrusive alternatives of control-
ling a patient before forcibly injecting medication over her objec-
tion5. 258
The Rogers court also recognized that an involuntary civil commit-
ment to a state mental institution did not constitute a determination
of a patient's incompetency to make treatment decisions. 2t3  The Mas-
sachusetts court, however, held that the State's parens patriae power
might justify forced treatment even in the absence of a finding of
incompetence "to prevent the 'immediate, substantial, and irreversible
deterioration of a serious mental illness,'... in cases in which 'even
the smallest of avoidable delays would be intolerable. -27° To continue
treatment beyond the immediate emergency, the treating doctors must
obtain a judicial determination of incompetency. 27 ' Moreover, even
where the patient has been adjudicated incompetent, Massachusetts
law only permits forced treatment if a judge determines that medica-
tion is in the patient's best interest. 272
B. Prison Inmates: Heightened Police Power Justification
In 1990, in Washington v. Harper, the United States Supreme Court
held that a state's interest in maintaining the safety and security of its
prisons justified forced medication of the inmates if it reasonably
furthered this goal. 273 Although the Court recognized that Harper's
liberty interest in avoiding antipsychotic drugs was substantial, 274 it
reasoned that the complexity of prison administration required defer-
ence to the decisions of prison officials. 275
In 1975, Walter Harper was convicted of robbery and sentenced
to prison. 276
 During much of his incarceration, he was housed in the
266 Id. at 401-92.
267 Id. at 509-11.
268 /d. at 510.
269 Id. at 494-95,
270 Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511-12 (quoting In reGuardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40,55 (1981)).
271
 Id. at 512.
272 1d. at 504-06.
279 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,223,236 (1990).
274 See SUP •a notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
270 1-fa/per, 494 U.S. at 223-24.
276 1d. at 213.
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prison's mental health unit, where he voluntarily received antipsy-
chotic drugs.277 In 1982, Harper complained of side effects from the
medication and refused continued treatment. 278 The treatment staff
initiated proceedings to compel medication, pursuant to the State's
policy, which provides that an inmate may only be involuntarily treated
if he (1) suffers from a "mental disorder" and (2) is "gravely disabled"
or poses a "likelihood of serious harm" to himself or others. 279
 More-
over, an inmate who refuses medication is entitled to a hearing before
an independent committee comprised of individuals not currently
involved in the inmate's diagnosis or treatment, as well as the right to
appeal from the committee's decision. 28° •
Harper succumbed to forced medication for several years before
challenging the State's actions under the federal Civil Rights Act. 281 In
1985, Harper brought a § 1983282 action in state court, claiming that
the State of Washington had violated the Due Process, Equal Protec-
tion and Free Speech Clauses of the federal and state constitutions by
involuntarily administering medication without first providing a judi-
cial hearing. 288 The state court, however, upheld the prison's decision
to forcibly medicate Harper, concluding that the independent hearing
and statutory right of appeal, protected Harper's interest in not being
arbitrarily subjected to unwanted medication."'
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's decision, holding that the State's procedures did not ade-
quately protect inmates' liberty interests. 285 Given the highly intrusive
nature of treatment with antipsychotic medication, the court reasoned
that a full judicial hearing was required to provide sufficient protec-
tion. 28" According to the Washington Court, before the State could
administer unwanted medication it must demonstrate that the treat-
ment was both essential and effective in furthering a compelling state
interest.287
277 Id.
278 See a. at 214, 239 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The institution's records indicate that
Harper exhibited dystonia (acute muscle spasms) and akathesia (physical-emotional agitation).
Id. at 240 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
279 /d. at 215.
28° Harper, 494 U.S. at 215-16.
281 See id. at 217.
282 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
283 Harper, 494 U.S. at 217.
284 Id. at 217-18.
288 1-1 arpe r v. State, 759 P.2d 358, 360 (Wash. 1988).
286 Id. at 363.
287 Id. at 364-65.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the Washington court's
decision, upholding the prison's policy of forcibly medicating inmates,
concluding that the State's interest in medicating dangerous men-
tally ill inmates outweighed the possible health and safety risks to the
individual. 288 Recognizing that many inmates have a "demonstrated
proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent conduct," the Court
reasoned that the State had a compelling interest in controlling inmate
behavior. 289 Moreover, the State's policy of forcibly medicating poten-
tially violent inmates was narrowly tailored towards achieving this in-
terest; it only allowed medication of mentally ill inmates who, as a result
of their illness, presented a significant danger to themselves or oth-
ers. 290
The Harper dissent, on the other hand, argued that the majority
improperly weighed this balance by ignoring several dimensions of
Harper's liberty interest in avoiding antipsychotic medication. 29 ' In
addition to violating Harper's bodily integrity, the dissent reasoned
that forceful medication with potentially harmful, mind-altering drugs
implicated Harper's right to reject medical treatment and his interest
in being free from governmental control of his mental processes. 292
Moreover, the dissent alleged that the Harper Court underestimated
the intrusiveness of antipsychotic drugs by erroneously discounting the
frequency and severity of the medication's side effects.292
In sum, courts have recognized that all persons retain a limited
right to refuse antipsychotic medication. Generally, a state's parens
patriae or police power interests have been held sufficient to override
that right only where the medication substantially furthers the state's
interest and where the classification of persons medicated is sufficiently
tailored towards achieving that goal. Moreover, if forced medication is
permitted beyond an emergency situation, the decision to medicate
must be made by an independent entity whose interests are not served
by the compelled medication.
288 Harper, 494 U.S. at 236.
289	 ata	 225-26.
29° Id. at 227-28.
291 See id. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting). justices Brennan and Marshall joined in Stevens'
opinion.
292 Id. at 237-38.
293 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 237 (Stevens,,., dissenting). According to the dissent, the Court
relied on an inaccurate, outdated and biased brief written by the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion. Id, at 239 n.5, Psychologists, claiming that the risk of side effects are severe, charge that the
psychiatrists minimize the risks associated with antipsychotic drugs out of fear of an explosion in
litigation involving the medicated patients. Id.
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VI. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO REVIEWING CHALLENGES TO
FORCED MEDICATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
In the past, state courts reviewing challenges to forced medication
of criminal defendants did not generally acknowledge their liberty
interest in avoiding the medication. After Riggins, however, courts that
have upheld a state's right to medicate defendants will need to reassess
their earlier holdings in light of this substantial interest. It should not
be presumed that these courts implicitly recognized that the state's
interest in adjudicating a defendant's guilt or innocence outweighed
her interest in avoiding antipsychotic medication when they permitted
the state to forcibly medicate her. The Riggins Court rejected such an
argument, directing the lower courts to acknowledge a defendant's
liberty interest and to affirmatively establish a state interest sufficiently
compelling to override it before permitting forced medication. 294 As
noted earlier, however, the Riggins Court did not provide guidance on
how courts should strike this balance, nor did it establish the standard
of review that courts should apply. 205 The following discussion is aimed
at aiding courts reviewing the forced medication of criminal defen-
dants by suggesting a comprehensive approach to balancing the state's
interests in compelling medication against the defendant's interests in
avoiding it.
Courts reviewing forced administration of antipsychotic medica-
tion must begin by acknowledging that criminal defendants have a
substantial liberty interest in avoiding unwanted drugs, which is pro-
tected from arbitrary government action by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Moreover, the courts must recognize that the forceful admini-
stration of antipsychotic medication is highly intrusive of this right
because of the many uncomfortable, distressing and potentially dan-
gerous side effects associated with these drugs. Because the Supreme
Court has established a floor rather than a ceiling for the level of
protection a state must provide individual rights, a court reviewing
forced medication need not limit its inquiry into the intrusiveness of
the drugs to the Harper Court's findings. 296 There is sufficient docu-
mentation to support an argument that the threat of injurious side
effects from antipsychotic medication is significantly greater than the
Supreme Court recognized. 297 A court may also want to consider other
294 Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1815-16 (1990).
29 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
296 See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
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dimensions of an individual's interest in avoiding medication. The
Harper dissent and the Ohio district court in Davis v. Hubbard both
recognized that compelled antipsychotic medication implicates a per-
son's ability to think and communicate freely as well as their right to
make their own treatment decisions.'"
Because a defendant's interest in avoiding antipsychotic drugs is
substantial, the state cannot medicate her absent an overriding jus-
tification. States do not, however, typically attempt to justify forced
medication of defendants under their traditional parens patriae or
police power interests; 2
 they neither demonstrate that a defendant is
incapable of making her own treatment decisions nor that she is a
danger to herself or others. Rather, the states allege that they are
justified in medicating criminal defendants to restore their compe-
tency to stand trial so that the state can adjudicate their guilt or
innocence."" Whether the state's interest in trying criminal defendants
outweighs their liberty interest in avoiding medication has not yet been
fully addressed by the courts.
Before a court can inquire into the sufficiency of a state's interest
in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of criminal defendants, it must
decide what standard of review it will apply. A court should not apply
the reduced standard of Harper, simply because the defendant is being
held in a state correctional institution. The Harper standard has its
origins in a state's heightened police power interest in maintaining
safety and security in its prisons."D 1
 This heightened state interest,
requiring deference to the operational decisions of prison officials, is
clearly not relevant to the restoration of a criminal defendant's com-
petency to stand trial. Not only is the justification unrelated to safety,
the defendants have only been accused of a crime, and thus, the state
has not yet established that they have a "proclivity for antisocial crimi-
nal and often violent conduct."" Rather, because a defendant's inter-
298 Harper, 494 U.S. at 237-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915,
930 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
255 If a state medicates a criminal defendant for traditional parens patriae or police power
reasons, it should not automatically try her while she is under the influence of the medication.
Rather, a court must still consider the impact of the medication on her ability to get a fair trial.
Moreover, consideration of less intrusive means of controlling a mentally ill individual may weigh
differently for a defendant who could be temporarily isolated or restrained physically during her
trial. Likewise, any determination that treatment is in a defendant's best interest must. necessarily
include consideration of the effect of medication on her trial.
300 See supra notes 90-154 and accompanying text.
sot Harper, 494 U.S. at 223-24.
302 See id. at 225-26 (reduced standard of review for convicted prisoners because of established
proclivity for criminal and violent conduct).
716	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 35:681
est in avoiding antipsychotic medication is fundamental, the court
should strictly scrutinize forced medication. In other words, the state
must demonstrate that the need to try the defendant was compelling,
that medicating her substantially furthered this goal, and that there
were no less intrusive alternatives.
States obviously have an interest in trying and punishing individu-
als that violate state laws. Moreover, because the state is prohibited
from trying incompetent defendants, it has a significant interest in
restoring a sufficient level of competency to enable them to stand trial.
Whether this interest is sufficiently compelling to override a defen-
dant's interest in avoiding potentially harmful, mind-altering drugs,
however, is unclear. The Riggins Court suggested that it might be,
citing Illinois v. Allen, a case in which the need to try an obstreperous
defendant was held sufficiently compelling to justify overriding his
right to be present in the courtroom."' Use of Allen to support the
overriding of a defendant's right to refuse antipsychotic medication,
however, is grossly misplaced. Allen involved neither an incompetent
individual nor forced administration of drugs; rather, removing Allen
from the courtroom burdened his constitutional trial protections."'
Moreover, the defendant in Allen deliberately interfered with the state's
ability to adjudicate his guilt or innocence."' There is a significant
distinction between an unruly defendant attempting to avoid trial
through his own misconduct and an incompetent defendant exercising
his constitutional right to refuse unwanted medication.
Because there is no precedent for holding that a state's interest
in trying defendants is sufficiently compelling to justify forced medica-
tion, the courts should consider this interest in conjunction with the
traditional parens patriae and police power justifications. Clearly, the
state's interest in adjudicating a person's guilt or innocence cannot be
encompassed under either of these justifications; the state is not trying
an individual for her own benefit, nor is it protecting her or others
from an immediate risk of harm. Although imprisoning potentially
violent criminals protects society, the courts have found that a state's
interest in protecting its citizens sufficiently compelling only where the
medicated person presents an identifiable risk of hartn.'w According
to the courts, the risk presented by mentally ill patients' proclivity for
"3 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
" See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
" Id.
3C6 Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Stipp. 915, 935 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Commissioner, 390
Mass. 489, 510-11 (1983).
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dangerous behavior is too vague to justify medication. 3" Likewise, the
risk of danger an accused presents to society should be regarded as too
tenuous a basis for overriding her substantial liberty interest in avoid-
ing potentially harmful, mind-altering drugs. Not only has the state not
yet proven that she is guilty of committing the violent act, the possibility
that she may commit future violence is too uncertain to create an
imminent threat. Moreover, even if an incompetent defendant is actu-
ally dangerous, the threat to society is not imminent because she will
not be released into the community. Rather she will be civilly commit-
ted until she regains sufficient competency to stand trial. 308
An alleged victim's interest in retribution and the state's interest
in punishing criminals also seem too remote to justify the forceful
medication of an individual who is only accused of a crime. Whether
the state has a need to punish a defendant cannot possibly be deter-
mined until after her guilt or innocence is established, or, in other
words, after it has medicated her. Moreover, the courts have long
agreed that the state cannot medicate patients or inmates for the
avowed, or even apparent, purpose of punishing them. Nor is it per-
mitted to carry out a death sentence on an "artificially sane" defen-
dant. 1° In sum, forcefully medicating a criminal defendant to restore
her competency to stand trial cannot be justified through any tradi-
tional means. Thus, if a court wants to permit the state to administer
unwanted antipsychotic drugs, it must recognize the state's need to
adjudicate an incompetent defendant's guilt or innocence as a new
justification. In light of the apparent reluctance of courts to expand
the traditional parens patriae or police power justifications, as well as
the long standing abhorrence against trying incompetent defendants,
courts must ask themselves whether this interest should ever justify
overriding a defendant's substantial liberty interest in avoiding antip-
sychotic drugs.
Even if a court concludes that the state's need to try defendants
is compelling, the state must establish that administering antipsychotic
drugs to a defendant substantially furthers this goal before it will be
permitted to forcefully medicate her. Thus, before the state administers
potentially hazardous drugs to a defendant, it must be able to demon-
strate that the medication will restore sufficient competency to enable
the defendant to stand trial. Given the uncertainty of predicting a
particular defendant's reaction to a particular antipsychotic drug, it is
3°7 Davis, 506 F. Stipp. at 935; Rogers, 390 Mass. at 510-11.
"8 Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1820 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring),
"Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So,2d 746, 747 (La. 1992).
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unlikely that the state can meet this requirement. 31° Moreover, it is
doubtful that the state could accurately predict whether the medica-
tion could sustain the defendant's mental capacity throughout her
tria1. 3"
The state's interest in trying defendants necessarily encompasses
an interest in ensuring that defendants receive a full and fair trial.'"
Otherwise, defendants' constitutional trial protections and the prohi-
bition against trying incompetent defendants would be meaningless.
A state could simply override these rights based on its need to adjudi-
cate defendants. Accordingly, the forceful administration of an tipsy-
chotic drugs during a defendant's trial cannot be said to substan-
tially further the state's interest in trying her, absent a substantial
showing that the medication will not prejudice her ability to get a full
and fair trial. Given the serious risk that antipsychotic drugs pose to a
defendant's ability and willingness to defend herself, as well as the
unpredictability of her reaction to the drugs, it is again difficult to
imagine how a state could make such a determination prior to medi-
cating the defendant.'" Indeed, the Riggins Court reasoned that it
would be too difficult to even determine actual prejudice, after a trial
was over. 314
When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, the state
must also demonstrate that the jury will not be influenced by the
defendant's altered demeanor. This is undoubtedly the most difficult
hurdle the state faces; not only must it predict the impact of the
medication on the defendant's appearance and attitude, but it must
also look into the minds of potential jurors and judge their potential
reactions. 313
 Providing expert testimony about the possible effects of
the medication does not resolve this inquiry. Rather, it adds one more
unknown; the state must also predict the impact expert testimony will
have on the jury. 316
Examining the outcome of the trial of "artificially sane" defen-
dants helps clarify whether forcibly medicating them substantially
achieves the state's goals. Many, if not most, of these defendants con-
tend that they are not guilty by reason of insanity. If the state tries them
and finds that they were insane when they committed the crime, then
310 See supra notes 162-66,225 and accompanying text
311
312 See supra notes 225-38 and accompanying text.
313
	 supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text
314
 Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810,1816 (1992).
315 See supra notes 229-38 and accompanying text
'116 Id.
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it must enter a finding of not guilty and resort to civil commitment.
Subsequently, if the defendant's sanity is restored, she will be free to
leave the institution. If the defendant instead is not medicated and
remains incompetent to stand trial, she will be civilly committed. If she
eventually regains sufficient competency, she will be tried. Then, if
found not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of committing the
crime, she will be civilly committed until she regains sufficient sanity
to be released. Either way, a defendant who is eventually found inno-
cent will be civilly committed until it is believed she can safely be
returned to the community.
On the other hand, a medicated defendant found guilty of a crime
will be immediately sentenced and incarcerated in a detention facility.
Because trying a defendant who is found not guilty by reason of
insanity ultimately achieves the same outcome as not trying her, medi-
cating her only furthers a state's interest if she is found guilty. Thus,
in reality, forcibly medicating a defendant does not serve a state's
interest in determining her guilt or innocence. Rather, it furthers a
state's interest in punishing those it finds guilty of violating its laws.
Courts reviewing the compelled medication of defendants should
thus consider whether the state's actions are tailored to achieving its
interest in trying and punishing individuals who have violated its laws.
The courts have traditionally abhorred any type of wholesale medica-
tion.317 In Davis, the Ohio district court concluded that the State could
not medicate mentally ill patients based solely on the possibility that
they might be dangerous, because it reached too broadly; most patients
in a mental hospital are likely to have demonstrated violence at some
time in their lives. 318 Likewise, forcibly medicating all incompetent
defendants is not sufficiently tailored to achieving the state's goal
because it entails medicating the innocent as well as the guilty.
Finally, if a court chooses to permit the state to medicate criminal
defendants, it must consider who will decide when medication is ap-
propriate. Under the parens patriae and police power rationale, the
courts have generally required an independent decision maker who
does not have a stake in medicating the individual.'" It is unclear who
would be both independent and qualified to make this decision for
purposes of restoring a defendant's competency. Neither the state nor
317 See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Commissioner,
390 Mass. 489, 499-500 (1983).
318 Davis 506 F. Supp. at 935.
319 Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489, 512-13 (1983); Washington v, Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 215 (1990).
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the court should be regarded as independent; both have a strong
interest in trying and punishing defendants. Although an independent
psychiatrist might be able to make a determination about a defendant's
ability to understand the proceedings and to communicate with her
attorney, he is unlikely to be qualified to make a judgment about the
effect of medication on a defendant's ability to get a fair trial. Further-
more, the disagreement between psychiatrists and psychologists con-
cerning the severity of the side effects of antipsychotic drugs, raises
doubt about the impartiality of psychiatrists. Possibly the state or court
could create an independent decision making body, composed of
different members of the psychiatric and legal professions. However,
given the unpredictability of the effectiveness and side effects of antip-
sychotic medication, it is questionable whether a committee could ever
reach agreement on whether it would be appropriate to forcibly medi-
cate a particular defendant during her trial.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because forced medication of criminal defendants implicates their
liberty interest in avoiding potentially harmful, mind-altering drugs
and creates a substantial risk to their ability to get a fair trial, challenges
to forced medication should be reviewed prior to defendants' trials.
When viewed from this perspective, it is apparent that a state will have
to overcome a nearly insurmountable set of obstacles before it should
be permitted to forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to a defendant.
First, because the state's avowed purpose is to restore a defendant's
competency to stand trial, to allow the state to administer the drugs, a
court must significantly expand the current limitations on an individ-
ual's right to refuse medication. In deciding whether to take this leap,
the court should recognize that the interest actually accomplished by
forcibly medicating defendants is the punishment of those defendants
who are ultimately found guilty by the court.
If a court decides this interest may override defendants' interests
in refusing medication, the court should require that an impartial
decision maker—one who understands all of the concerns created by
antipsychotic drugs—determine whether medication is permissible in
a particular case. This decision maker must establish that the type and
dosage of drug prescribed for a defendant is both appropriate and
necessary to restore her competency and that the medication will
maintain her competency throughout her trial. Likewise, it must de-
termine, with substantial certainty, that the medication will not impact
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the defendant's ability to obtain a full and fair trial. Accordingly, the
decision maker must not only establish that the drugs do not interfere
with the defendant's willingness or ability to understand and partici-
pate in the proceedings against he it must also demonstrate that the
impact of the drugs on the defendant's demeanor will not affect the
jury's decision.
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